top of page

Peter Brössel

Junior-Professor for the Philosophy of Perception and Knowledge and director of the Emmy Noether Research Group “From Perception to Belief and Back Again“ at the Department of Philosophy II and the Center for Mind, Brain, and Cognitive Evolution at the Ruhr-University Bochum. His research interests are in epistemology, philosophy of science and philosophy of cognition. In epistemology, his research centers on theories of rational reasoning and perception, and the relationship between reasons, epistemic rationality, and epistemic normativity. He also has a research focus on social epistemology, especially, peer disagreement and testimony.


His research in the philosophy of science focuses on theories of confirmation, causation and explanatory and systematic power. In the philosophy of cognition, he is interested in theories of representation and, especially, the interface between perception, language, and belief.


Philip Dawid

Philip Dawid is Emeritus Professor of Statistics of the University of Cambridge, and a Fellow of Darwin College, Cambridge. He is a leading proponent of Bayesian statistics. Dawid has made fundamental contributions to both the philosophical underpinnings and the practical applications of Statistics.

His theory of conditional independence is a keystone of modern statistical theory and methods, and he has demonstrated its usefulness in a host of applications, including computation in probabilistic expert systems, causal inference, and forensic identification.


His book Probabilistic Networks and Expert Systems written jointly with Robert G. Cowell, Steffen Lauritzen, and David J. Spiegelhalter, received the 2001 DeGroot Prize from the International Society for Bayesian Analysis.


Anna-Maria Asunta Eder

Anna-Maria Asunta Eder is Assistant Professor at the Chair for Epistemology, Philosophy of Science, and Logic of the Department of Philosophy of the University of Cologne. She is also an external member of the Emmy Noether Research Group From Perception To Belief and Back Again at the Ruhr-University Bochum. Her research focuses on debates in epistemology, general philosophy of science, and metaphilosophy. In epistemology, her research encompasses epistemic disagreement, epistemic pluralism, epistemic normativity, theories of justification, of evidential support and higher-order evidence, and the relationship between logic and reasoning. In the philosophy of science, she analyses the aims of inquiry, the relationship between confirmation and rationality, and the relationship between explanation and understanding.


Stephan Hartmann

Stephan Hartmann is Professor of Philosophy of Science in the Faculty of Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and the Study of Religion at LMU Munich, Alexander von Humboldt Professor, and Co-Director of the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP).


His primary research and teaching areas are philosophy of science, philosophy of physics, formal epistemology, and social epistemology.

He published numerous articles and the book Bayesian Epistemology (with Luc Bovens) that appeared in 2003 with Oxford University Press. His current research interests include the philosophy and psychology of reasoning and argumentation, the philosophy of physics (esp. the philosophy of open quantum systems and (imprecise) probabilities in quantum mechanics) and formal social epistemology (esp. models of deliberation and norm emergence).


His book Bayesian Philosophy of Science (with Jan Sprenger) will appear in 2019 with Oxford University Press.


Andrés Perea


Professor of Game theory at Maastricht University and Epicenter (Center for research in epistemic game theory).

Research interests: Foundations of game theory, epistemic game theory, foundation of decision theory.


Teddy Seidenfeld

Teddy Seidenfeld is H.A. Simon University Professor of Philosophy and Statistics at Carnegie Mellon University (Dietrich College of Humanities and Social Sciences). He works on foundations at the interface between philosophy and statistics, often being concerned with problems that involve multiple decision makers. For example, in collaboration with M.J. Schervish and J.B. Kadane (Statistics, CMU), they relax the norms of Bayesian theory to permit a unified standard, both for individuals acting as separate decision makers and collectively, in forming a cooperative group agent. By contrast, this is an impossibility for strict Bayesian theory. For a second example, in collaboration with Larry Wasserman (Statistics, CMU), they examine the short-run consequences of using Bayes rule for updating a set of expert Bayesian opinions with shared information. They focus on anomalous cases (they call dilation), where an experiment is certain to result in new evidence that increases the experts: uncertainty about an event of common interest where uncertainty is reflected in the extent of probabilistic disagreements among the experts.

His current collaborations with Kadane and Schervish include a theory for indexing the degree of incoherence in non-Bayesian statistical decisions, work on the representation of coherent choice-functions using sets of probabilities, and investigations involving scoring rules for probabilistic forecasts. The three also work together on the development of finitely additive expectations for unbounded random variables.


Jan Sprenger

Jan Sprenger (*1982) is Professor of Philosophy of Science at the 
University of Turin. After an undergraduate degree in mathematics, he 
completed a PhD in Philosophy (University of Bonn/Germany, 2008) with a  thesis on the foundations of inductive inference. Then he took up a post as Assistant Professor at Tilburg University (2008–13), where he also directed the Tilburg Center for Logic, Ethics and Philosophy of Science (2014–17, in the position of a Full Professor).

Sprenger has been awarded various major grants by Dutch, German and European funding agencies, most recently a Starting Investigator Grant on objectivity in inference by the European Research Council (ERC, 2015--20).

His papers are regularly published in the leading philosophy journals as well as in reputed interdisciplinary venues. They span a wide range of topics, mainly in philosophy of science (e.g., scientific method, explanation, causality, values in science) and uncertain reasoning (e.g., foundations of Bayesian inference, statistical reasoning), but also covering logic, group decision-making, and empirical work on human cognition. This summer, his first book publication, “Bayesian Philosophy of Science” (with Stephan Hartmann), will appear with Oxford University Press.

In his leisure time, Sprenger is an active chess player who also holds the Grandmaster title of the World Chess Federation.


Serena Doria: Introduction to Imprecise Probability

Researcher in Probability and Mathematical Statistics, University G.d’Annunzio Chieti-Pescara Italy.


Research Interests: Coherent conditional previsions and their extensions, Hausdorff measures, Choquet integral representation, Bayesian inference.

William Peden.jpg

William Peden: Introduction to Bayesian Epistemology


Postdoctoral research at the Polytechnic University of the Marche and research associate at the Centre for Humanities Engaging Science and Society, University of Durham.


Research interests: epistemic game theory (interactive epistemology), behavioural game theory, evolutionary game theory, philosophy of economics and mechanism design theory.


Mantas Radzvilas: Introduction to Game Theory


Postdoctoral researcher at the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, LMU.

Research interests: epistemic game theory (interactive epistemology), behavioural game theory, evolutionary game theory, philosophy of economics and mechanism design theory.


Momme von Sydow: Introduction to Bayesian Statistics and R


Postdoctoral researcher at the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, LMU.


Research interests: philosophical-psychological normative and empirical questions of individual and collective (ir-)rationality; Dawkins’s & Popper’s Darwinian metaphysics and its critique; Bayesianism.

Need more details? Contact us

We are here to assist. Contact us by phone, email or via our Social Media channels.

bottom of page